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Abstract 
McFetridge (1990) suggests that to treat a proposition as logically necessary – to believe 
a proposition logically necessary and to manifest that belief – is a matter of preparedness 
to deploy that proposition as a premise in reasoning from any supposition. We consider 
whether a suggestion in that spirit can be generalized to cover all cases of absolute 
necessity, both logical and non-logical, and we conclude that it can. In §2, we explain the 
significance that such an account of manifestation of belief in absolute necessity has for 
the prospects of a non-realist theory of modality. In §3, we offer a sympathetic 
articulation of the detail that underlies the McFetridge conception of belief in logical 
necessity. In §4 and §5, we show that the conception so articulated will not generalize to 
encompass all cases of belief in absolute necessity and proceed to offer a remedy. Our 
proposal is based upon a distinction between two kinds of suppositional act: A-supposing 
and C-supposing (§6). In §7, we then explain and defend our central thesis: (roughly) that 
(manifestation of) belief in absolute necessity is a matter of preparedness to deploy as a 
premise in reasoning under any C-supposition. Finally, we indicate that there is some 
promise in the parallel thesis that manifestation of the treatment of a proposition as a 
priori is a matter of preparedness to deploy as a premise in reasoning under any A-
supposition (§8). 
 2 
§1. Introduction 
We begin by endorsing four principles concerning necessity that we find in McFetridge 
(1990).
1
 (1) When one believes in the necessity of a proposition, the strength of the 
necessity in which one thereby believes is measured by the extent of the range of 
suppositions to which one is be prepared to add that proposition as a premise (in 
reasoning from that supposition). (2) It is, at least, a manifestation of belief in necessity 
that one should manifest such a disposition of preparedness to add as a premise over an 
appropriate range of suppositions. (3) The measure of absolute necessity is preparedness 
to deploy as a premise over the unrestricted range – in reasoning from any supposition 
whatsoever. (4) Belief in logical necessity is a case of (belief in) absolute necessity. To 
clarify (3) and (4) it is essential to draw a distinction between (belief in) the absoluteness 
of a kind of necessity and (belief in) the maximality of a kind of necessity. The distinction 
is illustrated by the following position: one might hold that there is a range of 
suppositions which is the widest range of suppositions to which any single proposition 
might (properly) be added as a premise, and yet think that this range is restricted (i.e., not 
exhaustive of all suppositions). In our preferred terminology, to accord a proposition this 
status would be treat it as maximally necessary but not as absolutely necessary: to be 
prepared to adduce a proposition as a premise across the unrestricted range of all 
suppositions would be to treat it as both absolutely and, a fortiori, maximally necessary.
2
  
We join many philosophers in endorsing the following body of claims: (5) that logical 
necessity is absolute necessity; (6) some propositions do not count as logically necessary 
in a strict, or narrow, sense but (7) are necessary in a significant alethic (and non-
epistemic) sense, and (8) that the necessity that attaches to them is no weaker than that 
which attaches to logical necessity. Thus we contend that some propositions hold with 
                                                        
1 We depart from McFetridge’s verbatim statement of these matters in two ways. Firstly, we make propositions rather 
than rules the locus of necessity. Secondly, we extrapolate general principles from cases where all that is given 
explicitly is the application of the principle to a particular case. 
2 In contrast to McFetridge, it would seem, there are those who hold: (a) that logical necessity is not absolute (even 
though it is maximal) and, more generally, (b) that there are no absolute necessities since, for any proposition, there is 
some supposition under which one ought not to add that proposition as a premise in reasoning from it. Thus, we 
suggest, Nolan (1997) and Priest (2005). Such a view is not only a formal possibility (showing that absoluteness and 
maximality are formally distinct), but may also have philosophical motivations. For instance, it may allow us to 
improve on the standard treatment of truth-conditions for counterfactuals with logically impossible antecedents and/or 
logically necessary consequents, by not making them automatically true (see also discussion in §7). Our project here is 
not to motivate such views; we just want to make clear how they would fit in our framework. 
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absolute but non-logical necessity, and, as is well known, broadly logical necessity, 
analytic necessity, mathematical necessity and metaphysical necessity are frequently 
understood that way. Our central question, then, is whether the McFetridge account of 
belief in absolute necessity can straightforwardly and successfully encompass the non-
logical case(s).
3
 But some ground must be cleared before that question can be addressed 
to any effect.  
Quite general issues are raised by any thesis, of the kind suggested by McFetridge, 
whereby the possession of some inferential disposition is necessary or sufficient for the 
possession of a belief – or even whereby manifestation of such a disposition is necessary 
or sufficient for the manifestation of such a belief. Among the general issues raised by 
claims of sufficient conditions are the following. Predictably, if we specify what appears 
to be a single or restricted inferential disposition, there will be the question of whether we 
have captured (even implicitly) all that is required by way of the belief, or its 
manifestation. Moreover, if we specify a condition that speaks only to the manifestation 
of the kind of belief in question, and not at all to any consideration of how the belief is 
acquired (or of phenomenology), the natural question to press is whether any such one-
sided condition can be sufficient for the possession of the belief.
4
 Among the general 
issues raised by claims of necessary conditions is the following. If we specify an 
inferential disposition that reflects a controversial principle of inference – for example, 
double negation elimination – then we seem bound to exclude from the ranks of those 
who share the kind of belief in question, any and all of those whose inferential 
dispositions reflect reasoned rejection of the principle. Such are (some of) the generic 
issues associated with (broadly) “inferentialist” theses about possession of concepts of 
                                                        
3 That some such account is applicable to absolute necessity in general is a view endorsed by Peacocke (1999, 172-3) 
and, in discussion thereof, by Wright (2002, 656-7). In each case, the matter is barely touched upon, but the detail of 
the swiftly stated claims turns out to be crucial from the standpoint of our extended discussion. Peacocke (op cit) 
characterizes the principles that are known to be necessary truths as those “which can be legitimately employed when 
reasoning within the scope of any counterfactual supposition whatsoever”. However, Wright (op cit) presents the view 
that “to regard a proposition as necessary is to hold that it may safely be assumed as an auxiliary premise, or rule, when 
reasoning about any arbitrary counterfactual – more generally, hypothetical – set of circumstances.” (The emphasis is 
ours in both cases). The crucial point is precisely whether the account of absolute necessity ought to proceed “more 
generally” in terms of any arbitrary hypothesis/supposition: Wright’s formulation suggests that it ought, Peacocke’s 
formulation suggests that it ought not. We shall, eventually, side broadly with the latter, although we shall also show 
why Peacocke’s formulation, as it stands, must be further restricted. 
4 We note that the thesis that the inferential disposition is sufficient for belief in the logical necessity of a rule is a 
crucial, but implicit, lemma in the “quasi-transcendental” argument for belief in (some) logical necessity that is 
proposed by McFetridge (1990, 153-4) and endorsed, in a significantly strengthened version, by Hale (1999). 
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various kinds, beliefs involving those concepts and their manifestation: but we will not 
explore any such general issues here.
5
 Rather, we ask the reader to allow that these 
general issues have not all been settled in a way that renders pointless the investigation of 
relevant theses in the specific case where the subject matter is belief about necessity. 
Within the programme of attempting to understand (manifestation of) belief in necessity 
in terms of an associated inferential disposition, our problematic is as follows.  
Little, if anything, has been done by way of attempting to articulate the concept that 
figures centrally in McFetridge’s various principles – preparedness to add a premise to 
any supposition – or to make plausible his account of belief in logical necessity. Here, we 
take on these tasks in (prima facie) defence of the following two theses: 
(LN1) For all X, if X believes that it is logically necessary that P then X is prepared to 
add P as a premise in reasoning from any supposition S 
(LN2) For all X, if X is prepared to add P as a premise in reasoning from any supposition 
S then X believes that it is logically necessary that P. 
We will subsequently turn our attention to the following theses: 
(AN1) For all X, if X believes that it is absolutely necessary that P then X is prepared to 
add P as a premise in reasoning from any supposition S 
(AN2) For all X, if X is prepared to add P as a premise in reasoning from any supposition 
S then X believes that it is absolutely necessary that P. 
We will argue that when read in light of the charitable elaboration that sustains (LN1) 
and (LN2), the theses (AN1) and (AN2) fail. Thus, we lack both an effective necessary 
condition, and an effective sufficient condition, for (manifestation of) belief in absolute 
necessity in general. That case is made in §3-5, and the remedy pursued in §6-7. But what 
follows immediately is an interlude in which we address important questions concerning 
the motivation, and the metaphysical presuppositions and implications, of the project. 
 
                                                        
5 For a relatively recent exchange that covers this general ground see Boghossian (2003) and Williamson (2003). 
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§2. Motivation and Metaphysics  
In this paper, we remain neutral on several further questions that concern with the 
manifestation of belief in necessity might provoke. Firstly, on explanatory priority: 
whether X believes it absolutely necessary that P because X has the appropriate 
inferential disposition, or vice versa. Secondly, on semantics: which is the correct (form 
of) semantic theory for either the modal sentences, or for any of the various conditional 
sentences that we consider? Thirdly, on any (broadly) metaphysical issue of the sort that 
puts modal realists (of various kinds) at odds with non-realist opponents. In this last 
matter, however, we do make the exception that we presume – contra strict non-
cognitivist positions – that it is perfectly appropriate to characterize the relevant kind of 
modal “commitment” as belief that it is (absolutely) necessary that P, and that the content 
it is absolutely necessary that P is truth-apt. But while our account excludes such a 
radical non-cognitivism, it is consistent with error theory about absolute necessity. As 
indicated, we believe that for certain P, it is absolutely but non-logically necessary that P; 
and that an adequate account of (manifestation of) belief in absolute necessity must make 
room for such a position is an important part of our dialectic. However, the account of 
(manifestation of) belief in absolute necessity that we will eventually present (§7) is 
perfectly consistent with the view that some agents do not believe in the absolute 
necessity of any proposition and even with the view that all such beliefs are false.
 
 
Alongside our present and extensive metaphysical neutrality we also maintain, 
nonetheless, that interest in our project is strongly motivated by its potentially crucial 
implications for the prospects of (a certain kind) of modal non-realism. Awareness of this 
point, as we shall now explain, informs our overall approach.  
Some will question any attempt to give directly non-trivial necessary (or sufficient) 
conditions for belief in absolute necessity when one might (it seems) proceed, instead, by 
giving directly a metaphysical, or semantic, account of absolute necessity “itself”, and 
then, perhaps, give a subsequent account of (manifestation of) belief in absolute necessity 
to suit.
6
 The latter approach will seem the more promising, and the more natural, to those 
with realist pre-dispositions: but it will strike others as worrying. One prominent worry is 
                                                        
6 For direct approaches to absolute necessity “itself”, see McFetridge (1990, §1) and Hale (1996). 
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whether such a realist approach can yield an appropriate explanation of why we are 
concerned to form (correct) beliefs about the absolute necessity of any P – concerned, 
that is, in a way that outruns our concerns in forming beliefs, simply, about whether non-
modal P is the case. And a standard non-realist strategy of response to that worry is to 
reverse the realist order of explanation: that is, to seek a functionally-driven conception 
of the kind of belief in question – one that focuses on the conditions under which we 
typically acquire, manifest and regulate such beliefs, as the basis of a minimal, or thin, 
explanation of what the talk of “facts” here amounts to.7 Such an account of belief in the 
case of absolute necessity might be hoped to present both an illuminating explanation of 
our attachment to such beliefs and, also, a challenge to anyone who is inclined to 
presuppose that a more substantive account of modal facts (along with a substantive 
account of the cognition of such facts) is required. To reiterate, we do not intend to make 
in this paper any claim that is incompatible with any form of realism about absolute 
necessity, or with the “realistic” order of explanation wherein we have certain inferential 
dispositions in virtue of having beliefs about absolute necessity (rather than vice versa). 
However, we also emphasize that the success of our proposal would add significantly to 
the resources that modal non-realists have at their disposal. So, we trust, in addition to its 
speaking to the (neutral) questions of how (certain of) our modal beliefs are manifest, and 
of why we are concerned to make (correct) modal judgements, our project is further 
motivated by its potential relevance to the dispute between modal realists and their 
opponents: it speaks to the prospects of a non-realist theory of modality, and as such 
ought to interest non-dogmatic realists and neutrals as well as to those who are already of 
non-realist pre-dispositions. Finally, in that regard, it is particularly significant that our 
account of belief in absolute necessity is, following McFetridge, rooted in the matter of 
the manifestation of such belief. One long-standing obstacle to the development of a 
plausible non-realist account of necessity has been the absence of an alternative to the 
following, persistent but unsatisfactory, idea: that to treat a proposition as necessary is to 
                                                        
7 The non-realist approach we envisage is very broad and inclusive. As indicated, it does require acceptance that the 
propositional surface of modal talk is in order – that we speak properly of modal beliefs, of modal truth etc. – and, as 
such, excludes radical (traditional) non-cognitivist positions. However, the still broad non-realism that remains is 
intended to encompass (for example) various positions described generically as “anti-realist” in Wright (1992) and also 
the quasi-realism of Blackburn (1986). For present purposes, we need not isolate any particular non-realist position 
within the acceptable range. 
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accord it a special epistemic status – typically, to protect it, in some special way, from the 
ordinary standards of appraisal or revision.
8
 Such an account of the manifestation of 
belief in (absolute) necessity strains all credibility and has few defenders these days, even 
in the case of a priori necessities: but it seems downright untenable once the prospect of 
(belief in) a posteriori absolute necessity is entertained. Consequently, the efforts of many 
relatively recent modal non-realists, such as Blackburn (1986), display two notable 
features. Firstly, there is great emphasis on the question of how belief in necessity is 
acquired (rather than how it is manifest). Secondly, there is an uncomfortable 
combination of awareness that an account of manifestation of belief in necessity as 
“putting in the archive” seems moribund, with the attempt, for want of an alternative, to 
make something of such an account – even in the a posteriori case (Blackburn 1986, 63-
4). In seeking an account of the manifestation of belief in necessity that is not tied 
(disastrously) to misplaced and excessive epistemic commitments, we join with the spirit 
of McFetridge (1990): but we cannot accept in the generic case of absolute necessity, the 
letter of the McFetridge proposal concerning the instance of logical necessity. 
§3 Understanding McFetridge on Logical Necessity 
In this section, we attempt to articulate McFetridge’s conception of the inferential 
disposition that is associated with (manifestation of) belief in logical necessity in such a 
way as to make it worth considering whether its possession is an effective necessary and 
sufficient condition for such belief, as per theses (LN1) and (LN2): 
(LN1) For all X, if X believes that it is logically necessary that P then X is prepared to 
add P as a premise in reasoning from any supposition S 
(LN2) For all X, if X is prepared to add P as a premise in reasoning from any supposition 
S then X believes that it is logically necessary that P. 
By way of charitable expansion and articulation of these theses, we propose the 
following: 
                                                        
8 McFetridge (1990, 146-50) finds fault in this respect with the anti-skeptical but non-realist view of logical necessity 
presented by Wright (1980, 1986): the point is taken in Wright (2002, 658). 
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(a) In understanding and defending the theses, we need be concerned only with two 
doxastic states: belief in the logical necessity of P, and non-belief in the logical necessity 
of P. Degrees of belief are not germane.  
(b) We restrict our attention, for the sake of present exposition and argument, to 
reasoning that is broadly deductive in intent, and monotonic in character. However, we 
see no obvious danger in expanding the scope of our final theses on belief in absolute 
necessity to other kinds of inference. 
 (c) The theses are to be read as constrained by a requirement of rationality: made explicit 
– for any rational X, …. Perhaps it is psychologically possible to have the belief and lack 
the disposition (or vice versa). Equally, perhaps it is psychologically possible to believe a 
conjunction without being prepared to infer its conjuncts, or to believe the conjuncts 
without being prepared to infer the conjunction. But just as there is some kind of 
irrationality afoot in the conjunction case, so (we intend) there would be in the case of 
absolute necessity. 
(d) The notion of preparedness (to add P as a premise …) needs to be construed sensibly. 
In the first place, preparedness is a disposition, the realization (manifestation) of which 
might be frustrated by the operation of any number of psychological causes (amounting 
to inattention, failure to recognize etc.). In the second place, the intended disposition 
cannot be taken as requiring for its realization that, in reasoning from any S, X would 
actually add as a premise any P believed logically necessary, no matter how irrelevant or 
redundant any such P might be, and no matter how many such P there are. One might, 
therefore, attempt to specify the disposition of preparedness by putting constraints on the 
conditions under which P will be added as a premise: conditions of (believed) relevance, 
non-redundancy, manageable number etc. We will not argue here that such an approach 
is doomed to failure. Our alternative suggestion is that the right sort of preparedness is 
passive rather than active: belief in logical necessity would not be played out in the manic 
addition of premises but, rather, in non-resistance to the addition of any such proposition 
as premise, or in the treatment of each such proposition as permanently available for that 
purpose. 
 9 
(e) The relevance of the rationality of X is the involvement of a certain kind of directed 
normativity: preparedness is to be understood as preparedness to add P as a premise (to 
any S) in attempting to reason well in certain respects. But which is the appropriate norm 
of reasoning? To establish this, let us focus on the sufficiency thesis (LN2).  
Certain norms are too weak to be fit for purpose because they generate attitudes that 
rational X will take to any proposition whatsoever (and not only to those she believes 
logically necessary). It is for this reason that no simple variant on validity is promising. 
For each S, then for every P, it is perfectly in keeping with one’s aim simply to reason 
validly that one should be prepared to form the set of assumptions (that is, premises 
and/or suppositions) {S, P}. Moreover, for each S, then for every P, if X judges valid the 
inference from {S…} to C, then (reflecting the orthodox assumption of monotonicity) X 
will judge valid the inference {S, P…} to C. Certain stronger norms are still too weak 
since they generate attitudes that X will take to any proposition that X believes to be true 
(and not only to those she believes logically necessary). Thus consider the norm of 
soundness – understood as meaning that inference is valid and all (non-discharged) 
assumptions, true. That X should aim to reason soundly from every supposition S is, of 
course, a non-starter as an effective norm in this context: for, in general, reasoning from S 
(in which S is not discharged) is often aimed at establishing what follows from S even 
when X is confident that S is false. Moreover, the norm of soundness-preservation is not 
apt either. On orthodox assumptions, if X judges as sound any inference from {S…} to C, 
(rational) X will also judge as sound any inference from {S, P…} to C just in case X 
judges P true. So preparedness to add P as a premise, to any supposition S, for the 
purpose of preserving the soundness of reasoning, is a mark of confidence in the truth of 
P and of no more. Therefore, as with validity, soundness simpliciter is a hopeless 
candidate to be the norm that renders (LN2) effective. But one norm that does render 
(LN2) effective, and the norm that we propose as (most) appropriate, is that of stability-
preservation.
9
 We explain this norm in two stages. Firstly, the structure: (for any X, P, S) 
X judges that the addition of P to {S} is stability-preserving just in case, if X judges that 
                                                        
9 There are hints in McFetridge (1990) that he has in mind something very much along these lines: for example, in 
articulating the key concept that figures in his explanations as the “co-tenability” of supposition and premise (ibid, 
151).  
 10 
{S} is stable, then X will also judge that {S, P} is stable. Secondly, the content: a set of 
assumptions being stable (or non-explosive) consists in it being the case that it does not 
have an arbitrary proposition as a consequence.
10
 The structure of the proposed norm is 
crucial. For that structure ensures that it is irrelevant to the satisfaction of the norm, and 
to X’s proper attempts to comply with it, what happens in the cases where X judges, or 
aims to show that, {S} is unstable, or in which X aims to form unstable {S, P}.
11
 The 
identification of the norm of stability-preservation articulates the precise respect in which 
necessity-believing X has a conviction to the effect that nothing will (ever) be lost by the 
addition of P as a premise. And what might be gained is – as always with premise 
addition – the opportunity to reach, properly or more easily, from S some conclusion C 
that was not, properly or so easily, attainable before.  
(f) Finally, as given in (e), we emphasize that we read both theses as being concerned 
with first-person reasoning: reasoning in which the aim of the reasoner is to establish to 
her own satisfaction, that certain propositions and inferences have certain features. We 
are not concerned with second-person, or third-person, reasoning in various dialectical or 
pedagogical contexts where the aim of the reasoner, X, is to convince others of what 
                                                        
10 As a heuristic, we suggest a broadly semantic understanding of “consequence”. We acknowledge, however, that 
further work on the project requires serious investigation of this (potentially) very important matter. 
11 Here we expand in response to a point raised by a referee. There is – of course – an important kind of reasoning 
wherein we (aim to) form an unstable set {S, P}, from stable S and stable P, and then discharge S in order to conclude 
on the basis of premise P, that not-S. (Note also the distinct and not strictly relevant case, in which we form unstable 
{S, P}, “discharge” P, and conclude on the basis of S that not-P; then we are not using P as a premise.) So our 
understanding of (LN1) and (LN2), since it is based on the norm of stability-preservation, does not speak to every case 
in which X believes P logically necessary and adds P as a premise in reasoning from S. Our proposed articulation of the 
McFetridge condition, in imposing the constraint that {S}, and then {S,P}, should be stable, restricts (in effect) the 
account of the manifestation condition of belief in logical necessity to consideration of the kind of reasoning that is 
aimed at establishing what is true-in-S, or what is the case according to S. But what, then, justifies that restriction? Our 
response is that there is no further justification. We contend that we have isolated a feature (norm) that allows 
articulation of the McFetridge condition in a way that (we will argue) succeeds in providing a necessary and sufficient 
condition for manifestation of belief in logical necessity. It does not detract from, or otherwise bear on, the 
effectiveness of that condition that the norm in question does not hold sway in (other) inferential contexts in which a 
proposition believed logically necessary might be deployed for other purposes – in particular, in contexts where 
discharge of an initial supposition is intended or enforced. Our account suffices to isolate the phenomenon of belief in 
absolute necessity (we claim), without aiming to encompass its full richness, and only the former is required in the 
context of the dialectic. We do not deny that it might be distinctive of belief in absolute necessity that when P is taken 
to be absolutely necessary it can be used in a kind of reductio to “rule out” the supposition S and so arrive at the belief 
that S is absolutely impossible. If that is so, then an account, in the spirit of ours but aiming, more ambitiously, to 
encompass the full richness of belief in absolute necessity, might have to enrich the ideas of stability and the aim of the 
relevant forms of reasoning, so that it is overall stability (achieved by rejecting S) rather than stability within a 
supposition, and whether S can be “ruled out” as well as what is true according to S, that are at issue. We do not take 
the exploration of such delicate issues to be crucial to the dialectic of this paper. For one thing, it would be unhelpful as 
an account of the inferential role of belief in absolute necessity to focus on interactions with other clearly modal 
beliefs; those interactions should eventually be explained once the inferential role has been characterised in relation to 
suppositional reasoning that is not itself aimed at modal belief. 
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would follow from a supposition by lights other than X’s own. For reasoning well in these 
other kinds of argumentative context, may require the satisfaction of constraints that 
differ from those required in the first-person case: e.g. the avoidance of question-begging 
against an opponent.  
The upshot, then, to be read within the scope of these various qualifications, but, 
introducing the crucial norm explicitly, is our preferred articulations of (LN1) and (LN2) 
– thus, (LN1+) and (LN2+): 
(LN1+)  For all X, if X believes that it is logically necessary that P then, in aiming 
at stability-preservation, X is prepared to add P as a premise in reasoning 
from any supposition S. 
(LN2+)  For all X, if, in aiming at stability-preservation, X is prepared to add P as a 
premise in reasoning from any supposition S, then X believes that it is 
logically necessary that P. 
We shall now argue for both of these theses. Throughout, since we are testing for 
stability-preservation we need only consider, and so restrict attention to, (all) cases in 
which {S} is judged stable by X: the subsequent question is whether X, if rational by her 
own lights, will also judge stable the set, {S, P}, formed by adding P as a premise to S. 
To test for sufficiency, (LN2+), we consider the contrapositive: if X does not believe it 
logically necessary that P then there will be some (counterexemplary) S* such that it is 
not the case that X is prepared to add P as a premise to S*. We then show that there are 
counterexamples in both of the relevant sub-cases of contrary belief: (i) belief that P is 
logically impossible and (ii) belief that P is logically contingent.
12 
(i) For any P that X holds logically impossible, every (stable) S is a counterexample: 
there is no supposition, S, such that X will hold that the set {S, P} is stable, for all such 
                                                        
12 The proper complement of the attitude of belief that is logically necessary that P is that of non-belief-that-it-is-
logically-necessary-that-P, and the latter admits of various agnostic sub-cases (e.g. complete agnosticism about 
necessity, or believing in non-impossibility but being no further opinionated). We cover those cases by pointing out 
that, in any case that encompasses agnosticism about the logical impossibility of P, preparedness is eliminated by 
awareness of risking (not being able to rule out) the dissipation of stability as it occurs in cases where one has belief in 
logical impossibility: similarly, mutatis mutandis, for any case that encompasses agnosticism about logical 
contingency. 
 12 
sets are rendered (for X) unstable by the presence of such a P. (ii) For any P that X holds 
logically contingent, we can generate a counterexample (under orthodox assumptions) by 
putting S* = not-P. P is logically contingent, in which case not-P is also logically 
contingent, and therefore stable: so S* (= not-P) is stable. But the addition of P to S* 
gives {S*, P} = {not-P, P} which is unstable. So for each such P we have some 
supposition S*, that is a counterexample.  
To justify the converse, (LN1+), consider what would be required of a counterexemplary 
S*: namely, that X is not prepared to add P as a premise in reasoning from S*, even 
though X believes it logically necessary that P. It is required, then, that {S*} be (judged 
by X to be) stable, and {S*, P} unstable. Since the latter requires that {S*, P} has as a 
consequence any proposition, it requires, in particular, that {S*, P} has as a consequence 
~P. But it follows then, under orthodox conditional reasoning, that {S*} should have as a 
consequence (P  ~P) and, thus, that {S*} alone should have as a consequence, ~P. 
However that is contrary to the requirement (for a counterexample) that {S*} be stable, 
because X takes ~P to be a logical falsehood and, as such, to have any proposition as a 
consequence. So there are no counterexamples to (LN1+).  
We do not commend the above as a watertight proof of the theses (LN1+) and (LN2+) - 
one that ought to compel any rational being. And, certainly, our justification relies 
implicitly on (certain versions of) principles of inference, such as conditional proof and 
ex falso quodlibet, that are – although entirely orthodox – controversial in some 
quarters.
13
 However, having attempted to articulate the crucial notion of preparedness 
sympathetically, and in a way that maximizes its plausibility and effectiveness in the case 
of belief in logical necessity, we fix that understanding and turn to the question of 
                                                        
13 We must distinguish our present concession that our recent justification of (LN1+) and (LN2+) relies on classical 
logical principles from the contention that (LN1+) or (LN2+) apply only to reasoners who adhere to such principles. 
The latter contention is far from evident, and we are strongly inclined to resist it. For our theses are intended to be 
tolerant of heterodox views about all sorts of matters as long as variations from the orthodoxy on one side (convictions 
about logical consequence, conditions of stability etc.) are matched by variations on the other (beliefs about logical 
necessity). Thus, see n2 above. We fully accept that the cases of variously non-classical logicians call for far more 
extensive consideration of the justification and formulation of the conditions than we offer here. And we signal again 
our reliance on an unspecified notion of logical consequence (see n10 above). However, we also seek permission to put 
aside such an enormous package of under-explored issues, pleading that the present treatment has already gone much 
further in exploring the underlying issues from a classical standpoint than has previously been attempted. 
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whether the condition that emerges can be applied immediately to the case of belief in 
absolute necessity in general. Our answer will be that it cannot. 
§4. The Case of Belief in Non-Logical A Priori Absolute Necessity 
We will argue (for a start) that (LN1+) does not allow generalization to all cases of belief 
in absolute necessity. Consider, then, the generalized thesis, (AN1+): 
(AN1+)  For all X, if X believes that it is absolutely necessary that P then, in 
aiming at stability-preservation, X is prepared to add P as a premise in 
reasoning from any supposition S. 
The case of absolute, non-logical, a priori necessity does enough to raise serious worries 
about (AN1+): but the case of absolute, non-logical a posteriori necessity, we contend, 
provides a refutation. The problem, common to both cases, is clear. Take a proposition P 
that you believe to be absolutely but non-logically necessary. Consider then the 
supposition that not-P. Since you do not consider P logically necessary, you will consider 
not-P (strictly) stable. But then there is a supposition (not-P) which you regard as 
intrinsically stable, but such that you cannot take the addition of P as a premise to that 
supposition to preserve stability. 
One strategy of response is to broaden the understanding of what is involved in stability-
preservation or, to invoke McFetridge’s term, “co-tenability”. In the a priori case, that 
might play out as follows. Imagine that you have the conviction that certain mathematical 
or analytic truths are absolutely but non-logically necessary: that 1≠0, perhaps, or that all 
bachelors are male. The aim, then, is to introduce a notion of stability or tenability such 
that the negations of these propositions would not be (intrinsically) stable or tenable, 
since it would then be the case that their negations are not eligible to figure as counter-
exemplary suppositions: they are not suppositions such that stability would be dissipated 
by adding as a premise the proposition held necessary. 
For our purposes, and especially since we are not concerned to defend the next move, we 
need only make a basic point about the direction in which it is likely to be made. 
Concerns about how belief in necessity is manifest call into play, at this point, 
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considerations about how such belief is acquired. It is a venerable theme that, in the case 
of the range of a priori necessities (narrowly logical or otherwise) the (epistemological or 
phenomenological) basis of the conviction is a certain kind of inability – in a relatively 
recent version, inability “to make anything of” the contrary.14 And, of course, if one finds 
oneself unable to make anything of the supposition that (say) 1=0, whether or not one 
takes it to be strictly explosive, one is not in a position where there is a kind of tenability 
or stability attained and which risks subsequent dissipation by the addition of any 
premise. 
§5. The Case of Belief in A Posteriori Absolute Necessity 
We do not wish to explore here whether or not the strategy of enriching stability succeeds 
in the a priori case, because we are more confident that such a strategy cannot succeed in 
allaying concerns about the a posteriori case, as we shall explain. Our thought is that the a 
posteriori case is the hardest to square with McFetridge’s account of belief in absolute 
necessity, and thus that in defending and amending the account we do best to confront 
that most recalcitrant case squarely. We will then arrive at an account which can cope 
with both the case of belief in a posteriori absolute necessity and the case of belief in 
non-logical a priori absolute necessity. 
Consider an essentialist who – following her reading of Kripke (1980) – comes to believe 
that some claims of kind, or origin, or composition are absolutely necessary; moreover, 
she claims that she has an a posteriori warrant for her belief in the (metaphysical) 
necessity of these propositions (subsequent to her having an a posteriori warrant for 
belief in the relevant the non-modal propositions). Counter-essentialist suppositions 
appear to offer further counterexamples (to (AN1+)) since stable reasoning from them 
seems eminently feasible – the suppositions, for example: (i) that Socrates was a robot; 
(ii) that (actual) Water is an element, or (iii) that George W is not the son of George. It 
would appear to follow from the respective suppositions (and taking other things we 
                                                        
14 See Blackburn 1986. We emphasize here that it is no part of our present concern whether any kind of necessity is co-
extensive with any kind of inability to conceive or inability to make anything of. We are presently concerned only with 
the (canonical) psychological circumstances that prompt such belief, and while an account of justification might be 
constructed out of those resources, we do not claim that the obtaining of these circumstances is inevitably justificatory 
of such belief, far less what “makes it true”. 
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believe as further premises): (i*) that there was a robot in ancient Greece; (ii*) that the 
predominant stuff in Lake Geneva is an element and (iii*) that Jenna is not the 
granddaughter of George. Moreover, there is no prior or independent case for thinking 
that just anything follows from any of these suppositions (provided we do not add other 
premises which bring about instability). But, for example, were our (classical) essentialist 
to add to the stable supposition, (i), that Socrates was a robot, the further (stable) premise, 
(i*) that Socrates was not a robot, then clearly (she would find that) stability would not be 
preserved.  
The first strategy of response is that, previously advertised in the a priori case, of finding 
a suitably broad norm that would allow us to classify the counter-essentialist suppositions 
as unstable (or untenable) and, thus, enable their removal them from the realm of 
stability-dissipating, counterexamples. However, the kind of norm on which hopes might 
be pinned in the a priori case is simply not in prospect in the a posteriori case. It is not 
remotely plausible, on any prior and neutral understanding of the notion, that those with 
Kripkean (or other) modal sensibilities find themselves “unable to make anything of” the 
thoughts that Socrates is a robot, that Water is an element, or that George W is not the 
son of George. It certainly appears that one can have these thoughts and make something 
of them – for example, in all sorts of non-trivial and discriminating reasoning from them 
(see above). How else – especially in such matters as the determination of the 
composition of Water – other than by making such thoughts the content of our 
suppositions, and reasoning from them, are we to discover whether they are false? On 
that observation we rest our case for the hopelessness of the first strategy. 
The second strategy of response is to attempt to deal with these cases by ruling against 
there being a belief in absolute necessity. We note, again, that the pursuit of this strategy 
is unsatisfactory if based on simple insistence. Why can the Kripkeans not have their self-
ascribed beliefs, and manifest them appropriately, even if these might be described as 
from the standpoint of an alternative modal sensibility, as false beliefs or beliefs that they 
ought not to have? Yet this strategy might be supported by some justification that goes 
beyond simple insistence, and in the present case it may appear that such justification is 
at hand. For one might attempt to scrutinize, and then weasel away at, the non-modal 
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content of the essentialist’s beliefs with a view to making the case that – seen aright from 
her own perspective – she does not believe in the absolute necessity of exactly those 
propositions which are intimated. Thus, for example, one might observe that our 
essentialist does not quite believe that – say – Socrates is human, or that George W is the 
son of George in every possible world (to advert temporarily to that idiom): what she 
believes, rather, is that at every possible world at which Socrates exists, Socrates is 
human, or that at every possible world at which George W exists, George W is the son of 
George. So, in line with such restricted quantification over possible worlds, it may seem 
perfectly reasonable to say that our Kripkean essentialist does not believe in the absolute 
necessity of the propositions in question. However, behind such ‘weak’ necessities, 
‘strong’ necessities lurk, and they are outed by conditionalization. For what our 
essentialist does believe, under this hypothesis, is that at (unrestrictedly) every possible 
world, if Socrates exists, then Socrates is human, or that at (unrestrictedly) every possible 
world, if George W exists then he is the son of George. Consider, then, the supposition 
(iv) that George W exists and is not the son of George. It is clearly the case that the 
essentialist cannot properly aim to reason stably from that supposition if prepared to add 
as a premise that if George W exists then he is the son of George. For (logical) instability 
is delivered from that combination in short order and, thus, a new set of counterexamples 
emerges. 
Finally, before turning to our strategy for amending of (AN1+), and its companions, it is 
natural at this point to raise, and to address, the suspicion that the moral of the a 
posteriori counterexamples is that the McFetridge conditions on belief in logical 
necessity track the presence in that case (and elsewhere) of a conviction in the a priority 
of P. Hence the alternative hypothesis, (AP1+):  
(AP1+) For all X, if X believes that it is a priori that P then, in aiming at stability-
preservation, X is prepared to add P as a premise in reasoning from any 
supposition S. 
This alternative hypothesis would have to get past the issue already raised for the 
application of (LN1+) to cases of a priori non-logical necessity: namely, that 
counterexamples will emerge unless some credible, but not narrowly logical norm of 
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stability is available. However, a further obstacle to (AP1+) is presented by an obvious 
test case. Thus, consider our Kripkean’s conviction that it is an a priori truth that the 
Standard Metre Rod, (“Rod”), at the time the standard is set, was 1m in length, and 
consider the supposition that Rod (at the time the standard is set) had turned out to be a 
little shorter than 1m in length. Clearly, our Kripkean cannot properly aim to reason 
stably from that supposition while being prepared to add as a premise that Rod is 1m in 
length – despite her conviction that this is an a priori truth: for logical instability is 
delivered from that combination in short order. So just as the necessary a posteriori 
generates counterexamples to (AN1+), so the contingent a priori generates 
counterexamples to the alternative hypothesis (AP1+). As always, we could legislate the 
counterexample away by insisting that no-one ever really, and rationally, believes to be a 
priori that which she also believes to be contingent. But it would be an undesirable 
feature of any envisaged condition on belief in a priority that it should rely on such 
sweeping legislation. And, in any event, a better explanation, of the appropriate kind, is 
available of both belief in a posteriori necessity and of belief in a priori contingency. 
§6. A-Supposition versus C- Supposition  
The explanation of the counterexamples to (AN1+), and the proper development of the 
McFetridge insight from the logical case, depends on drawing a distinction between kinds 
of supposition that is overlooked in the various theses formulated thus far. This 
distinction between kinds of supposition echoes other distinctions that are drawn in the 
literature on modality. Perhaps even more importantly, it is (arguably) an entirely natural 
and pre-philosophical distinction, since it is reflected in familiar distinctions of mood 
(indicative versus subjunctive) and tense (conditional versus non-conditional) in natural 
languages. 
At first pass, consider the data on which Lewis (1973: 3ff)) (following Adams (1970)) 
famously draws in order to motivate the recognition that conditional statements differ in 
semantic kind (content). One might hold true: (a) that if Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy then 
someone else did, while not holding true, (b) that if Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy (if 
Oswald were not to have killed Kennedy) then someone else would have. It seems a short 
step from recognition that some important difference of (broadly) meaning is afoot in 
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these conditionals, to recognition that there is some important difference afoot in the 
related suppositions: suppose that Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, versus, suppose that 
Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy.  
At second pass, consider the different kinds of conceiving – prompting thoughts of 
different kinds of possibility, and of different kinds of proposition – discerned by the 
advocates of 2-dimensional semantics for modalities (e.g. Chalmers 2002). In that 
tradition, it is suggested that while one can conceive-as-actual a world of a certain 
character, one cannot conceive-as counterfactual such a world (and vice versa). It seems a 
short step from recognizing that some important difference is afoot in these kinds of 
conceiving to recognition that there is some important difference afoot in the following 
pair of suppositions: suppose (actually) that Hesperus isn’t identical to Phosphorus, 
versus, suppose (counterfactually) that Hesperus were not identical to Phosphorus.  
Thus, we claim, there is a natural, compelling and operable distinction between the 
activities of A-supposition and of C-supposition. And while more detailed investigation 
of this distinction is merited than can be offered here, initial explanation and elucidation, 
at least, might be offered along the following lines.
15 
When we A-suppose, we typically project assumptions that vary from our beliefs about 
what is actually the case: and we do so – usually – for such purposes as working out how 
things would look if certain things are true which we currently believe false, or about 
which we are presently agnostic. When engaging in such reasoning, what is A-supposed 
is treated in some respects as if it were believed (but not in every respect – in particular 
one may not infer from the A-supposition that P, that one believes that P in the 
supposition). The way in which what follows from an A-supposition deviates from what 
is antecedently believed is epistemic: when we believe that P, and A-suppose that S, P 
will still be believed under the supposition unless S is (taken to be) a defeater for our 
knowledge that P. For example, under the A-supposition that Oswald didn’t shoot 
                                                        
15 To forestall misunderstanding, in our usage, one and the same proposition may be the object of A-supposing and the 
object of C-supposing. An A-supposition (C-supposition) is a propositional attitude of A-supposing (C-supposing) that 
P. We also note, following a referee’s suggestion, that some suppositions may be neither determinately A-suppositions 
nor determinately C-suppositions yet may (nonetheless) be fit for inferential purpose (taken either way), e.g. suppose 
the rationality of the square root of 2… 
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Kennedy, we still believe that someone shot Kennedy, since what is supposed is not a 
defeater for that belief. Our evidence that someone shot Kennedy goes beyond our 
evidence that Oswald shot Kennedy. Under the A-supposition that George is not George 
W’s father, we no longer believe that George is Jenna’s grandfather, because the 
supposition is a defeater for the latter belief. We have no evidence that George is Jenna’s 
grandfather that retains its force if George is not George W’s father. Reasoning under A-
supposition is thus linked to issues of epistemic or evidential dependence.  
When we C-suppose, we are concerned not with such evidential dependence but instead 
with some form of (broadly) worldly dependence. It is not entirely illuminating to say 
that this kind of dependence is counterfactual dependence, but at least we point to a 
salient distinction when we say that counterfactual dependence is not (in the earlier 
sense) epistemic. What is C-supposed is treated less as if it were believed than what is A-
supposed; rather it is considered as a limiting condition on a world, where that world may 
be non-actual, and the conclusions of the suppositional reasoning concern that world.
16
 
The interest of such reasoning lies in the constraint that the world under consideration 
must (in one development of the thought) be as similar as possible to the actual world, 
with some priority in the relevant similarity relation given to general facts over particular 
ones. For example, under the C-supposition that Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy (if we 
believe that Oswald, alone, did shoot Kennedy) we are agnostic about whether someone 
shot Kennedy. This is because, after adjusting our view of the world under consideration 
to take into account both the supposition and the general facts, we do not get a clearly 
more coherent view of that world either by affirming or denying that someone shot 
Kennedy. Under the C-supposition that Rod is a little shorter (than it actually was) on the 
day that the standard was set, Rod is not 1m long: and that is because we are considering 
how the length of a non-actual rod, as it were, compares to the standard fixed in the 
actual case.  
§7. C-Supposition and Treating a Proposition as Absolute Necessity 
                                                        
16 We intend here – as throughout, and as an instance of our official metaphysical neutrality – to be neutral with respect 
to realist versus non-realist conceptions of talk of possible worlds. 
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Given that the (natural, compelling and operable) distinction between the activities of A-
supposition and of C-supposition, there should be no surprise in our subsequent 
contention that it is C-supposition to which belief in absolute necessity is primarily and 
essentially connected. A-supposition has an epistemic flavour, in a way that C-
supposition does not. We are familiar with the idea that there is a notion of absolute 
necessity (possibility) that differs from that of epistemic necessity (possibility). 
Consequently, a theory which connects belief in such absolute, and non-epistemic, 
necessity to just one kind of supposing ought not to seem ad hoc so long as (as in our 
case) it is the kind of supposing that is non-epistemic (in the foregoing sense) to which 
such belief is connected. If we follow Kripke in enforcing the distinction between the 
concept of absolute necessity and (at least superficially) related concepts such as that of a 
priority, we should likewise enforce the distinction between different kinds of supposition 
when trying to connect these to the concepts of absolute necessity and a priority. And 
once we insist on the distinction between these kinds of supposition, the appropriate 
advertising slogan for an effective McFetridge-like condition on (manifestation of) belief 
in absolute necessity is that it is a matter of preparedness to deploy as a premise under 
every C-supposition. In what follows, we shall often revert to that slogan, but not before 
we proceed towards (the justification of) the more restricted formulation that underpins it. 
Firstly, we can quickly argue – rather than merely intuit – that an effective sufficient 
condition on belief in absolute necessity cannot be given, primarily, in terms of A-
supposition. It is insufficient to believe a proposition absolutely necessary that one should 
be prepared to deploy it as a premise under every A-supposition, for that condition is 
satisfied by the Kripkean who believes in the contingency and a priority of any P. Such a 
thinker may be fully prepared to add to every A-supposition, S, the premise that Rod is 
1m in length while maintaining conviction in contingency of that proposition. If 
preparedness with respect to all A-suppositions is insufficient then so, a fortiori, is 
preparedness with respect to any restricted range of A-suppositions. So if a sufficient 
condition (in the McFetridge style) for belief in absolute necessity is to emerge, it must 
be formulated in terms of attitudes to C-supposition. In this regard, we also observe that 
in the case of belief in absolute a posteriori necessity, the kinds of supposition that 
generated counterexamples to (AN1+) were, invariably, A-suppositions – suppositions 
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about how things actually are which vary from our beliefs about how things actually are 
in those respects: that Socrates is a robot, that Water is an element and that George W is 
not the son of George. Restriction to consideration of what one does when reasoning 
from C-suppositions disqualifies such, previously eligible, counterexamples. 
Secondly, however, we do not achieve an entirely accurate necessary condition on belief 
in absolute necessity by a simple formulation that adverts (as per our slogan) to what X 
would be prepared to add as a premise when reasoning under every C-supposition.
17
 The 
reason is that for every a posteriori proposition, Q, even the Kripkean will allow, one can, 
properly C-suppose that Q, and one can properly C-suppose that not-Q: one can properly 
C-suppose that Socrates is human (suppose that Socrates had still been human but instead 
of having gone in for philosophy …) and one can, under the A-supposition that Socrates 
is not human, properly C-suppose that Socrates is not human (suppose that Socrates had 
still been non-human but instead of having gone in for philosophy …). So, to take the case 
in residence, the Kripkean thinker believes that it is absolutely necessary that Socrates is 
human and yet there is a proposition Q (that Socrates is not human) such that she will 
allow that she can properly C-suppose that Q, but to which she cannot (with stability-
preservation in mind) add the premise that Socrates is human. The point is that we 
sometimes C-suppose within the scope of an A-supposition, and if we allow those nested 
C-suppositions to count we get counterexamples to the slogan. It is the un-nested kind of 
C-supposition that we want to restrict ourselves to here: the kind where the background to 
C-supposition is the reasoner’s (non-modal) beliefs, not A-suppositions which may be 
contrary to those beliefs. What happens under nested C-suppositions concerns what the 
reasoner believes to be absolutely necessary under the relevant A-supposition, not what 
she believes to be absolutely necessary tout court, and the two may differ when what is 
A-supposed differs from what she believes. The slogan can thus easily be fixed by 
employing that restriction: (manifestation of) belief in absolute necessity is a matter of 
preparedness to deploy as a premise under every un-nested C-supposition. 
                                                        
17 The formulation of Peacocke (1999) is as per our slogan, and our explanation here will justify why we say (in n3 
above) that that formulation will not do as it stands. 
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The upshot is that we propose a pair of theses expressing that a single (complex) 
condition in the style of McFetridge is necessary and sufficient for (manifestation of) 
belief in absolute necessity. 
(AN1-C) For all X, if X believes that it is absolutely necessary that P, then in 
aiming at stability-preservation X is prepared to add P as a premise to any 
un-nested C-supposition S (that she makes with her non-modal beliefs, 
rather than some contrary A-supposition, in the background).    
(AN2-C) For all X, if in aiming at stability-preservation X is prepared to add P as a 
premise to any un-nested C-supposition S (that she makes with her non-
modal beliefs, rather than some contrary A-supposition, in the 
background), then X believes that it is absolutely necessary that P.
 
 
We note that it is possible to argue, as below, for (AN1-C) from reasonably plausible 
principles concerning belief in counterfactual conditionals.  
(C1) For all X, if X believes that it is absolutely necessary that P, then, for every S, X 
will be prepared to believe S > P [i.e. any counterfactual conditional which has P 
as its consequent]. 
(C2) For all X, for every S (if X is prepared to believe S > P, then X will also be 
prepared to add P as a premise when aiming to reason stably from S as an un-
nested C-supposition). 
Therefore, 
(AN1-C) For all X, if X believes that it is absolutely necessary that P, then in 
aiming at stability-preservation X is prepared to add P as a premise to any 
un-nested C-supposition S. 
To see that this argument is valid, consider a purported S which was a counterexample to 
(AN1-C), i.e. such that X believed that P was absolutely necessary but was not prepared 
to add P as premise in reasoning aiming at stability preservation from the un-nested C-
supposition of S. By the relevant instance of (C2), it follows that S is not prepared to 
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believe S > P. Yet (C1) states that, whatever S is, X is prepared to believe S > P given 
that X believes that P is absolutely necessary. So any purported counterexample to the 
conclusion generates a contradiction when conjoined with the premises. 
We do not propose to defend our premises, (C1) and (C2), at any length here, but note the 
following. Firstly, some (e.g. Nolan (1997)) will want to hold that some counterfactual 
conditionals with necessary consequents (and with impossible antecedents) are false, e.g., 
if Hesperus were not identical to Phosphorus, then Hesperus would be identical to 
Phosphorus. But in light of that observation, we apply here our view (see n2 above) that 
such philosophers do not believe that the relevant necessity is absolute, and so they do 
not provide compelling counterexamples to (C1). We note here the intuitive difficulty in 
making sense of someone who claims that P is absolutely necessary but who denies that P 
would be true whatever the circumstances. Secondly, the principle (C1) represents a link 
between belief in counterfactuals and belief in necessity, and a relatively weak link at 
that. To see this, it is important to emphasize various theses to which we are not 
committed via (C1). Thus (C1) does not bring commitment to its non-doxastic relative, 
(C1*): 
(C1*) If it is absolutely necessary that P, then, for any S, S > P 
Nor, a fortiori, does (C1) bring commitment to any strengthening of (C1*) which 
expresses logical or semantic entailment. Nor does commitment to (C1) involve 
commitment to any converse thesis – not the converse of (C1) itself, nor the converse of 
(C1*). Nor does (C1) commit us to any properly epistemic thesis that concerns the 
conditions (concerning knowledge of counterfactuals) under which X knows that it is 
absolutely necessary that P. So in all of these respects, (C1) is weaker than – for example 
– the central claims of Williamson (2007).18 As for (C2), we will simply note the intuitive 
plausibility of moving from, “Were it that S, it would be that P”, to “Supposing that S 
were the case, it would be that P”, and thence to adding P as a premise in reasoning 
(aiming at stability) under the un-nested C-supposition that S. We are not aware of these 
moves being controversial 
                                                        
18 To point out absence of commitment in these respects is not, of course, to express opposition. 
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Having formulated, defended and offered argumentative support for our principle (AN1-
C) we return, finally, to the matter of its distance from inappropriately epistemic accounts 
of what it is to manifest belief in absolute necessity.
19
 (AN1-C) and (AN2-C) share with 
the earlier McFetridge-like conditions for logical necessity ((LN1) and (LN2)) the feature 
that they specify an inferential disposition (of X) that need not be permanent, nor 
perceived by X as such. It is perfectly in keeping with the ascription of an inferential 
disposition of such a shape and content that X should lose that disposition – perhaps 
under the impact of X’s coming to make something of the proposition, not-P, of which 
she was previously unable to make anything and treated as untenable. Indeed, it is in 
keeping with the ascription of such an inferential disposition, that one should lose that 
disposition for having come to believe that it is not actually the case that P. One might be 
able to perfectly well conceive of evidence that would persuade one not to believe P, and 
our account allows for that because such epistemic connections concern A-supposition 
rather than C-supposition. And so, we have an account of what it is to treat a proposition 
as absolutely necessary – to believe that it is so and to manifest that belief – that is 
perfectly consistent with the defeasibility of belief in the absolute necessity of P and even 
of P itself.  
§8. A-Supposition and Treating a Proposition as A Priori 
In light of the earlier diagnosis of the failure of (AN1+), and the ensuing distinction 
between A-supposition and C-supposition, a further, and more speculative, hypothesis is 
suggested. Just as treatment of a proposition as absolutely necessary is essentially a 
matter of having a certain inferential disposition with respect to C-supposition, so – one 
might think – treatment of a proposition as a priori is a essentially a matter of having a 
similar inferential disposition but with respect to A-supposition.
20
 In particular, consider 
the following hypotheses: 
                                                        
19 See the final part of §2 above. 
20 The notion of treating a proposition as a priori may sound initially odd, but we hope to convince the 
reader in what follows that this is exactly what is at issue in certain discussions of a priority – in particular, 
that of Quine (1951). 
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(AP1-A)  For all X, if X believes that it is a priori that P, then, in aiming at stability-
preserving reasoning, for any S, X is prepared to add P as a premise to the 
A-supposition that S. 
(AP2-A)  For all X, if in aiming at stability-preserving reasoning, for any S, X is 
prepared to add P as a premise to the A-supposition that S, then X believes 
that it is a priori that P. 
Recall the earlier considered necessary condition, (AP1+): 
 (AP1+) For all X, if X believes that it is a priori that P then, in aiming at stability-
preservation, X is prepared to add P as a premise in reasoning from any 
supposition S. 
The new hypothesis (AP1-A) shares with its predecessor (AP1+) that it would have to get 
past the issue already raised for the application of (LN1+) to cases of a priori non-logical 
necessity: namely, that counterexamples will emerge unless some credible, but not 
narrowly logical, norm of stability is available. However, what was a further obstacle to 
(AP1+) is no obstacle to (AP1-A). For in the contingent a priori case, the kind of 
supposition that generated the counterexample to (AP1+) was a C-supposition: given that 
Rod is actually 1m in length, suppose that it had not been so. And the restriction to A-
suppositions puts that kind of counterexample to (AP1+) out of the range of 
counterexamples to (AP1-A). What remains is that when our Kripkean thinker, A-
supposes about Rod, and intends to reason stably from that supposition, she must not add 
as a premise that Rod was shorter than 1m when the standard was set: for that is 
effectively to suppose the contradiction that the Rod was (actually) shorter than it 
(actually) was. 
The secondary hypothesis pair (AP-A) is problematic (at least) in that it is controversial 
whether the kind of status (if any) it picks out among beliefs really deserves to be called 
belief as a priori. There is, certainly, a question about whether the status picked out by 
(AP-A) matches (even in extension), various traditional or antecedent conceptions of the 
a priority of propositions – for example as propositions that can be known (or belief in 
them acquired or warranted) independently of experience. Also, we note that it will be 
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natural for certain 2-dimensional semanticists, again following Chalmers (2002), to 
characterize (AP-A), in relation to (AN1-C) and (AN2-C), as picking out belief in a 
second kind of necessity (necessity-1, versus necessity-2) that might attach to a 
proposition. However, while (AP-A) is (undoubtedly) problematic, we offer here some 
justification of the claim that it is also attractive, and potentially illuminating in ways 
which encourage its exploration.  
Firstly, given (AP-A) in addition to the conditions on belief in absolute necessity, we 
have an explanation not only of the limitations, but also of the attraction that many have 
felt, to McFetridge-like theses (such as (AN1+)) even though they do not benefit from the 
distinction between A-supposition and C-supposition. From the present standpoint, given 
the (AN-C) theses as well as the (AP-A) theses, we can appreciate that the effect of 
framing a McFetridge condition in terms all supposings, is to capture the sort of belief 
that passes both the C-supposition tests and the A-supposition tests: that is, belief that a 
certain proposition is absolutely necessary and a priori – the Kripke-analyticity of a 
proposition (Kripke 1980: 39). So, those who take propositions of (broad/narrow) logical 
necessity to be Kripke-analytic will find an unrefined McFetridge condition compelling 
as a necessary condition for belief in logical necessity: and such a condition will strike as 
a compelling sufficient condition those who take only propositions of (broad/narrow) 
logical necessity to be Kripke-analytic. That, perhaps, is enough to account for why many 
have been drawn to the McFetridge account as an account of belief in logical necessity.  
Secondly, and of much wider interest, we commend (AP-A) as capturing the Quinean a 
priori. Certainly, it seems that given the A-supposition theses in addition to the C-
supposition theses we have richer resources from which to construct an appropriately 
fine-grained Quinean position in this region. One might think that it is (at least) desirable 
that the result of subjecting an orthodox Quinean to the C-supposition tests (in particular 
the sufficient-condition test, (AN2-C)) should be that that she emerges from those as 
treating no proposition as absolutely necessary. However, for such a Quinean, a more 
fundamental question hangs over any C-supposition thesis. One can see why it would be 
of interest to isolate a class of propositions which we hold tenable under all C-
suppositions, or indeed to establish that the putative class of such propositions is empty – 
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or at least that is so if, but perhaps also only if, one could tell a story about why we go in 
for C-supposition at all. In that light, (AN1-C) and (AN2-C) offer the prospect of an 
explanation of the function, purpose or utility of belief in (absolute) necessity in general – 
the desirability of which is a common theme of McFetridge (1990) Peacocke (1999) and 
Wright (2002). However, the explanation in prospect is partial in light of the further 
question of the very point of C-supposition: and whether there is any such serious point, 
is another familiar focus of Quinean modal skepticism. But the activity of A-supposing is 
in Quinean good standing. Our Quinean, we suggest, will be happy to grant that the 
framing of A-suppositions is indispensable and central to our cognitive and scientific 
activity – for example, for the purpose of framing and testing the observational 
consequences of hypotheses. Accordingly, great, and easily explicable, importance would 
attach to any propositions that we ought to hold invariant under every A-supposition. One 
might think it illuminating, then, to re-cast central claims of Two Dogmas (Quine 1951) 
as the theses: (a) that any A-supposition can be made stable (in some holistic context) and 
(b) that there is no proposition which merits addition as a premise in aiming to reason 
stably from every A-supposition (in every holistic context). In that light, we attribute to 
our orthodox Quinean, via (AP2-A), the following central commitment: she does not, for 
any P, believe it a priori that P. If we isolate further the case of belief in the analyticity, or 
analytic necessity, of P as belief which requires belief that it is a priori that P, then our 
Quinean does not, for any P, believe that it is analytic that P, nor that it is analytically 
necessary that P. Moreover, our Quinean will diagnose belief in others that some P is 
analytic, or that some P is analytically necessary, as manifestation of (what the history of 
science shows to be) unwarranted preparedness to add P as a premise to every A-
supposition S, when aiming to reason stably to conclusions which are true-in-S. 
However, our main topic has been the treatment of propositions as absolute necessity, 
rather than as a priori and in conclusion we recapitulate our core contention as follows. 
The central insight of McFetridge (1990), there trained on the case of belief in logical 
necessity in particular, can be developed into a version that applies to belief in absolute 
necessity in general and tout court: but only if we are prepared to draw, and apply, a 
fundamental and crucial distinction between A-supposition and C-supposition, and to 
explicate belief in absolute necessity as, essentially, a matter pertaining to the latter. 
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